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ATTORNEYS’ FEES—LAST DITCH STAND?
BRUNO ZELLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
MILENA –Dor–dević, in an excellent article, advances very compellingarguments that attorneys’ fees are not governed by the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG).1  It is correct to say that arguments for and against the CISG gov-
erning attorneys’ fees only go so far, but not all the way—otherwise, there
would be no debate on this point.2  The question that comes to mind after
reading the article is not which of the arguments is correct, but which one
goes the furthest and hence, can potentially resolve the issue.  The fact
that this is an important issue has been noted by Eric Schwartz: “When an
international commercial dispute arises, the cost of resolving it may be as
important to the parties as the merits of the claims themselves.”3  Further-
more, as –Dor–dević correctly states:
The possibility of recovering attorneys’ fees as damages is particu-
larly important in countries where legal costs are not recoverable
under the pertinent procedural rules, but it is also important in
“loser pays” countries since such a possibility would require
change of their long established practice of awarding legal costs
under the procedural code and rules (and not as part of the
damages claim).4
If the issue of attorneys’ fees could be resolved, it would enhance the
harmonisation effort of international trade.  The fact that in the majority
of jurisdictions the recovery of legal costs is part of civil procedure does
not render the CISG inapplicable.  It is admitted that the CISG in general
* Bruno Zeller is an Associate Professor and Victoria University Adjunct
Professor at the Murdoch University School of Law in Perth, Australia.  Fellow of
the Australian Institute for Commercial Arbitration, Associate, The Institute for
Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Panel of Arbitrators—MLAANZ.
Visiting Professor Stetson Law School, Florida.
1. See generally Milena –Dor–dević, “Mexican Revolution” in CISG Jurisprudence and
Case-Law: Attorneys’ Fees as (Non)Recoverable Loss for Breach of Contract, in PRIVATE LAW
REFORM IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE: LIBER AMORCORUM CHRISTA JESSEL-HOLST 199
(Mirko S. Vasiljevic, Rainer Kulms, Tatjana Josipovic & Maja Stanivukovic eds.,
2010).
2. For an excellent article summarising and discussing the issues emanating
from the debate, see Keith William Diener, Recovering Attorneys’ Fees Under CISG: An
Interpretation of Article 74, 2008 NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 1 (2008), available at http://
www.njcl.utu.fi/1_2008/article3.pdf.
3. Eric A. Schwartz, The ICC Arbitral Process, Part IV: The Costs of ICC Arbitration,
4 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 8, 8 (1993).
4. –Dor–dević, supra note 1, at 203.
(761)
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is only applicable to resolve substantive issues, but equally well, it is obvi-
ous that if procedural issues are within the four corners of the CISG, these
issues will also be resolved.  The words of Peter Schlechtriem ring true
especially in relation to this debate, as he notes: “The question is often
phrased as a problem of the borderline of substantive (CISG) rules and
the procedural law of the forum, but this is avoiding the real issue in favor
of a conceptual approach, resulting in solutions quite different from coun-
try to country.”5  It is of value to first note all the points that are not in
dispute.  The arguments in this Article can therefore concentrate on the
points of diversion.  There are, in general, two issues that seem to be the
sticking points.  First, and hence the question, is Article 74 applicable?
Second, because attorneys’ fees are part of a procedural rule, are attor-
neys’ fees not covered by the CISG?  However, the real question is if Arti-
cle 74 was applicable, would it draw an otherwise applicable procedural
rule into the now-substantive issues of Article 74?
First, it is acknowledged that Article 74 is based on the principle of
full compensation, and hence, it can be concluded that “all kinds of losses,
suffered by the party and caused by the breach, are recoverable in principle
under the CISG.”6  Furthermore, it is also not in dispute that the CISG
does not expressly exclude attorneys’ fees from the category of losses.  The
most serious challenge against an Article 74 argument has been advanced
by –Dor–dević, who argues in brief that:
[T]he causal link between the breach and the claim for attor-
neys’ fees [is] interrupted.  Consequently, in my view, once the
litigation is instituted the incurred attorneys’ fees become a loss
that is too distinct from the usual loss suffered as a consequence
of breach of contract thus not allowing for its recovery under
Article 74 of the CISG.7
This issue will be addressed in detail in Part III.  This Article will ar-
gue that only two arguments have a valid claim to be seriously considered
to resolve the issue of attorneys’ fees.  Part II will lay out the main argu-
ment for an inclusion of the fees via Article 74 and Part III will address the
issues brought up by –Dor–dević, supporting her claim that attorneys’ fees
are not included in the regime of the CISG.
II. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCLUSION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
In essence, –Dor–dević, after examining the arguments of other au-
thors, lists five major objections against the inclusion of attorneys’ fees, of
which only the first two issues are discussed in this Article.  The other
5. Peter Schlechtriem, Non-Material Damages—Recovery Under the CISG?, 19
PACE INT’L L. REV. 89, 96–97 (2007).
6. –Dor–dević, supra note 1, at 205.
7. Id. at 216.
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three points are not of prime importance and can be subsumed into the
first two points.  The objections are advanced by:
1. “[T]hose who are basing their argument on the drafter’s intent”
(or lack thereof);
2. “[T]hose who find recovery of attorneys’ fees . . . against the equal-
ity of the parties to the sales contract”;
3. “[T]hose who find the CISG principles not well-suited to deal with
the calculation of attorneys’ fees as recoverable loss”;
4. Those who combine one or two of the above reasons; and
5. The majority of case law is against a recovery under the CISG.8
The first two points arguably can be dismissed without great effort.
Just because the drafters are silent on a point does not automatically sug-
gest that attorneys’ fees are excluded.  The words within the four corners
of any legislation, including the CISG, must be consulted first.  If there is a
gap, or if the words or meaning are not clear, extrinsic material such as
the travaux préparatoires can be consulted.  As the drafters did not com-
ment on this particular issue of inclusion, it does not mean that the ques-
tion of attorneys’ fees has been decided in the positive or negative form.
It is left to the interpreter to come to a conclusion and to make sense
of the text of the conventions.  In the case of the CISG this inquiry is
guided by Article 7, which states that the CISG’s general principles should
assist in coming to a conclusion.  It is argued that the full compensation
argument is more compelling in this case than the lack of authority in the
travaux préparatoires, as an argument cannot be simply based on a lack of
the drafters’ intent.  The opinion of the CISG Advisory Council supports
this point:
The issue of whether litigation expenses should be considered as
damages for purposes of Article 74 cannot be resolved through a
substance/procedure distinction.  Whether a matter is consid-
ered substantive or procedural may vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction and may depend on the circumstances of a particular
case.  Relying upon such a distinction in this context is outdated
and unproductive.  Instead, the analysis should focus on whether
the payment of litigation expenses is deliberately excluded from
the Convention and, if not, whether the issue may be resolved “in
conformity with the general principles on which [the Conven-
tion] is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity
with law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international
law.”9
8. See id. at 206.
9. Int’l Sales Convention Advisory Council, Calculation of Damages Under
CISG Article 74, Advisory Council Opinion No. 6, cmt. 5.2 (2006) (footnotes omit-
ted), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html.
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Closely connected to a lack of the drafters’ intent is the observation
made by the Advisory Committee in relation to the substantive and proce-
dural distinction within the CISG.  This is topical considering that Zapata
Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co.10 in the end was decided
on the procedural issue.  As Judge Posner stated: “The Convention is
about contracts, not about procedure.  The principles for determining
when a losing party must reimburse the winner for the latter’s expense of
litigation are usually not a part of a substantive body of law, such as con-
tract law, but a part of procedural law.”11
However, it is important to draw some parallels to the substantive and
procedural distinction in association with the general principles as noted
in Article 7(2).  A very good example is the burden of proof, and it is of
value to address this issue by analogy.
The question of attorneys’ fees and the burden of proof have in com-
mon that there is no clear “in or out” evidence within the four corners of
the CISG.  However, the distinguishing feature is that the travaux
préparatoires are very clear on this point.  In relation to the burden of
proof, the express exclusion of the burden of proof from the text of the
CISG is in itself a deliberate move by the drafters of the CISG to ensure
that the burden of proof is dealt with on a domestic law level.12
In this respect, it has been contended that:
[D]elegations speaking on the burden of proof . . . were all quite
definite that it was not the intention to deal in the Convention
with any questions concerning the burden of proof.  The consen-
sus was that such questions must be left to the court as matters of
procedural law.13
Peter Schlechtriem and Franco Ferrari argue that the burden of
proof issues are governed by the Convention and that, as it is not men-
tioned expressly, there is an “internal gap” which should be resolved with
reference to the two-step methodology in Article 7(2), referring first to the
general principles underlying the CISG, and only in the absence of such
principles, private international law.14  Most compelling are the argu-
ments put forward by Ulrich Magnus, who strongly argues that the burden
of proof is governed by general principles.15  John Gotanda also argues:
Applying national laws to determine the level of proof needed to
recover damages under article 74 can lead to differential treat-
10. 313 F.3d 385 (7th Cir. 2002).
11. Id. at 388.
12. See Stefan Kröll, The Burden of Proof for the Non-Conformity of Goods Under Art.
35 CISG, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 162, 168 (2011).
13. Harry M. Flechtner, Selected Issues Relating to the CISG’s Scope of Application,
13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 91, 102 (2009) (citation omitted).
14. See id. at 103.
15. See generally Ulrich Magnus, General Principles of UN-Sales Law, 3 INT’L
TRADE & BUS. L. ANN. 33 (1997).
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ment of similarly situated parties.  This is because national laws
differ not only on the level of proof needed to recover damages,
but also on whether the matter is governed by substantive or pro-
cedural law.16
The conclusion is that, in relation to the burden of proof—and no
doubt any procedural issues where a general principle can be found—the
observation can be made that the issue is “so closely connected with the
application of the substantive provisions that it would be impracticable to
separate the two.”17  If the argument made by many scholars, that the bur-
den of proof is governed within the CISG, is accepted, then it becomes
difficult to reject the argument that attorneys’ fees cannot potentially be
included as well.
The whole argument hinges on Article 7(2), namely, the gap-filling
function.  It is universally accepted that in order to have a gap, the issue in
question cannot be explicitly governed within the CISG nor explicitly ex-
cluded.  That said, both the burden of proof and attorneys’ fees would
qualify as potentially falling under general principles.  The point is that
the burden of proof has been rejected in the travaux préparatoires, whereas
attorneys’ fees have not.  From that point of view alone, the burden of
proof should be excluded and governed by domestic law, which it is not.
The simple fact is that the CISG has not only included substantive
legal issues, but also perhaps inadvertently included procedural issues.
Hence, the argument that an issue is procedural in nature and therefore
must be excluded from the CISG is simply not sustainable.  Stefan Kröll
correctly noted in relation to the burden of proof that it is “not a mere
rule of procedure with no or only limited influence on material justice.
Quite to the contrary it resolves about material considerations which are
comparable to those underlying the substantive requirements for the cre-
ating and existence of rights.”18  The same argument also holds for the
inclusion of attorneys’ fees to be governed by the CISG.  In relation to the
drafters’ intention, Schlechtriem should have the last word on this issue as
he notes: “Codes age.  So do Conventions promulgating Uniform Law.
Provisions on interpretation and gap-filling, like the CISG’s Article 7 . . .
may be used to prevent petrification.”19
The second issue set forth by –Dor–dević also does not have any merits,
as the issue of attorneys’ fees is a breach of contract and not a question of
equality.  Admittedly, Articles 45 and 61 provide very similar remedies to
buyers and sellers.  However, the important aspect of both articles is that
the remedies are directly linked to a breach of contract by either buyer or
16. John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Damages Under the United Nations Convention on
the International Sale of Goods: A Matter of Interpretation, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 95, 109
(2005).
17. Kröll, supra note 12, at 169 (footnote omitted).
18. Id.
19. Schlechtriem, supra note 5, at 89 (footnote omitted).
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seller.  If the respondent wins the legal issue, then the court in essence
decides that there was no breach.  In this case specifically, the question of
the applicability of Article 74 does not arise.  What has happened is that
now a gap exists which needs to be filled by domestic law.  This is so be-
cause the remedy of claiming attorneys’ fees is not contemplated within
both Articles 45 and 61, and hence falls outside the sphere of the CISG.
Does it create an inequality?  The answer is no.  In the first place, if there
is a breach, then the CISG potentially applies.  If there is no breach—that
is, the defendant wins—the remedy must be sought under the applicable
domestic law, as the CISG is silent on attorneys’ fees.  Equality is guaran-
teed not entirely via the CISG, but by the applicable governing law.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUSION OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
The following main arguments are listed in support of the inclusion
of attorneys’ fees under the CISG:
• The plain meaning of Article 74;
• The principle of full compensation;
• The principle of foreseeability;
• The duty to mitigate;
• The general principle of reasonableness; and
• The reading of the preamble that is the endeavour to promote
uniformity.
The district court’s decision in Zapata correctly notes that the
harmonisation of sales law, being a cornerstone of the CISG, must, where
possible, overcome variations in domestic laws.20  The best tool to do so is
Article 7 combined with Article 8.21
It is admitted that court judgements are not a clear indication as to
the recovery of attorneys’ fees under the CISG and hence, it is not a per-
suasive argument to rely on court decisions.22  Case law arguably cannot
fully support one or the other side of the argument, including Zapata.  As
–Dor–dević quoted a maxim,23 the liberty is taken here to do so as well,
namely that “one Swallow does not a summer make.”24  David Dixon put it
succinctly when he noted:
20. See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., No. 99 C
4040, 2001 WL 1000927, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2001) (quoting MCC-Marble Ce-
ramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.F.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1391 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
21. It should not be forgotten that Article 8, in effect, excludes the parol evi-
dence rule and hence, to exclude the “American rule” does not create a
precedent.
22. See –Dor–dević, supra note 1, at 214.
23. See id. at 219.
24. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. 7 (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 9th ed. 1954).
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss4/16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR416.txt unknown Seq: 7 11-JUL-13 9:25
2013] ATTORNEYS’ FEES 767
Regardless whether scholars are supporters or opponents of
Judge Posner’s opinion, they all agree on three things.  First, that
Judge Posner did not follow the rules of analysis of CISG article
7.  Though some supporters believe that attorneys’ fees are not
governed by the CISG, and the opponents believe that they are,
both sides agree that Judge Posner misapplied the rules of article
7.  Second, though somewhat related to the first, both sides agree
that Judge Posner was careless in not attempting to analyze the
general principle of the CISG.  If attorneys’ fees are governed by
the CISG, then there is an abundance of authority to suggest the
general principle of full compensation would apply, leading to
the conclusion that attorneys’ fees should be included in loss.
Third, both sides agree that Judge Posner improperly cited exclu-
sively to U.S. cases and completely ignored case law from other
CISG state parties.25
Given the above and ignoring the weaknesses in Judge Posner’s judge-
ment, the argument can be boiled down to the fact that the main objec-
tion against attorneys’ fees is that the loss is not a consequence of the
breach of the contract, and the very nature of the recovery of attorneys’
fees speaks against a consequential loss.26  However, it must be noted that
the payment of attorneys’ fees is closely linked to the breach of the con-
tract and is solely caused by that breach.  In other words, but for the
breach, there would be no cost, as this author states:
To put a party into a position—it would have been financially—is
simply asking the question, has the balance sheet changed?  If
the asset base is diminished as a consequence of the breach, then
those items diminishing the asset base must be understood to fall
under the principle of full compensation pursuant to Article
74.27
–Dor–dević does agree with the fact that attorneys’ fees constitute a fi-
nancial loss.28  Prevailing opinion notes that Article 74 limits the recovery
to material losses emanating from the breach of contract.  Financial losses
fulfil this requirement.
The question that needs to be looked at is: what is included within
“material losses” and is it directly linked to the breach as well?  This is so
because the main argument against attorneys’ fees being covered by Arti-
cle 74 is that there is no direct link to the breach.  It is argued that the
question which needs to be asked is did the balance sheet change because
25. David B. Dixon, Que Lastima Zapata!  Bad CISG Ruling on Attorneys’ Fees Still
Haunts U.S. Courts, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 405, 428 (2007).
26. See –Dor–dević, supra note 1, at 215–16.
27. BRUNO ZELLER, DAMAGES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 151 (2005).
28. See –Dor–dević, supra note 1, at 215.
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of, or but for, the breach and was such a loss foreseeable?  It is argued
that, as an example, goodwill has been recognised as falling under Article
74 as it fulfils the above requirements.29  In the end, the question is: was
the damage foreseeable?  This can be answered in the positive.
It is of value to briefly look at the question of whether breaches of
ethical standards give rise to a demand of damages under Article 74.  This
is so because those “who [are] interested in compliance with ethical stan-
dards—want[ ] to claim damages from the buyer who does not use the
goods in an ethical way.”30  This is an interesting point because the loss is
not directly attributed to a physical fault of the goods, but rather, a philo-
sophical fault that taints the goods.  Ingeborg Schwenzer and Benjamin
Leisinger argue that:
In this regard, it is submitted that the loss of the seller equals the
eventual difference between the contractual value of the goods—
i.e. the purchase price—and the real value of the goods, taking
into account the unethical use that is intended and the possible
consequences arising there from.  Such claims for damages serve
two functions.  First, the equilibrium of the contract is reestab-
lished.  The seller’s unethically generated profit is transferred to
the buyer who—hypothetically—either would not have con-
cluded the sales contract or would have bought the goods at a
much lower price.31
The authors argue that the balance sheet has been disturbed; hence,
Article 74 will re-establish the necessary equilibrium.  In relation to attor-
neys’ fees, the same argument can be mounted on the grounds that the
buyer would not have bought the goods had he known that they were
unsuitable.
IV. DISCUSSION
–Dor–dević indeed advances a very powerful argument, namely:
[T]he recovery of attorneys’ fees incurred in litigation indeed
differs from recovery of such fees before litigation.  The differ-
ence results from the nature of litigation itself, since its initiation
(filing a claim in the court and delivering the claim to the defen-
dant) transforms the two-party relationship i.e. sales contract
(buyer-seller) into a three party relationship i.e. litigation (plain-
tiff-court/arbitration tribunal-defendant).32
29. See ZELLER, supra note 27, at 125.
30. Benjamin Leisinger & Ingeborg Schwenzer, Ethical Values and International
Sales Contracts, in COMMERCIAL LAW CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY—JAN HELL-
NER IN MEMORIAM 249, 275 (Ross Cranston, Jan Ramberg & Jacob Ziegel eds.,
2007).
31. Id.
32. –Dor–dević, supra note 1, at 216.
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The argument, therefore, is that the three-party relationship shifts the
costs onto the court-plaintiff relationship that is focused on the litigation
and not the breach.  Therefore, it is argued that the causal link between
breach and loss is interrupted.33  The point that is made is that a tripartite
relationship has now been created because the court has, at the same time,
a relationship not only with the buyer but also with the seller.  This obser-
vation is correct, and it also supports the argument that awarding attor-
neys’ fees is against the equality of the parties to the sales contract.
However, the problem with the above argument is that it relies on the
fact that the causal link between breach and loss has been interrupted.
Indeed, but for the breach, such a tripartite relationship would not have
been created and attorneys’ fees would not have been incurred.  In other
words, the tripartite relationship is causally linked to the breach of the
contract.
It is obvious that a breach will trigger many tripartite relationships.  As
an example, the party suffering the damages must mitigate the losses pur-
suant to Article 77.  If the party relying on the breach enters into a con-
tract with a warehouse to store the goods, putting them at the seller’s
disposal creates a three party relationship.  The three parties are the seller,
buyer, and the warehouse owner.  There is no debate that the buyer can
recover the costs he incurred as part of the Article 74 argument.  It is also
not disputed if the court finds against the buyer, that he cannot recover
any mitigation costs.  The contract has been confirmed and the buyer
must bear all the costs he incurred.  No inequality arguments have been
raised in this context.
Furthermore, the law often creates inequalities.  As an example, a
seller supplies defective goods, clearly breaching Article 35.  The buyer,
however, does not examine the goods in a timely fashion and hence did
not notify the seller of the defect within a reasonable time.  The CISG
would, in such a case, deny the buyer a right to claim damages.  If it is
asked whether justice has prevailed, the answer is yes, because the buyer
did not follow the law.  Simply put, both parties are in breach of the CISG,
but the breach of Articles 38 and 39 negate the breach of Article 35 be-
cause of policy considerations that are not in dispute.  The difference be-
tween the relationship of breach and notification is akin to the
relationship between breach and costs, particularly with attorneys’ fees.
The exception being, of course, in the latter case, the CISG is not clear.
V. CONCLUSION
The argument of –Dor–dević in relation to a tripartite relationship is
very convincing and powerful.  However, it is also argued that the balance
sheet approach is equally convincing because it shows that there is a po-
tential break between the legal action of breach and the court action.
33. See id.
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–Dor–dević supports her argument by citing a maxim that reflects the guid-
ing idea: “If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck,
then it probably is a duck.”34  However, it is only “probably a duck,” and in
retort, there is an animal called the wood duck.35  It looks like a duck,
swims like a duck, and also quacks like a duck, but in fact belongs to the
family of geese.
Where does this leave the debate, or would the real duck please stand
up?  A court could follow either argument, which of course is not condu-
cive to a uniform application of the CISG.  It is argued that the solution
lies in the reading of the CISG preamble.  The object of the CISG is to
establish “a New International Economic Order.”36  The parties to the
Convention were also of the opinion that the adoption of the CISG “would
contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and pro-
mote the development of international trade.”37
John Gotanda notes specifically in relation to procedural issues:
The practice of determining whether an issue is governed by ap-
plicable procedural law instead of the Convention is outdated,
counterproductive, and should be abandoned.  Instead, tribunals
should try to fill gaps by trying to find a solution within the Con-
vention itself, through an analogical application of specific provi-
sions or on the basis of principles underlying the Convention as a
whole, before turning to domestic law.  This approach would
lead to more consistent and predictable awards of damages and
would ultimately further the goal of the Convention to create
uniform commercial law.38
The conclusion is that, arguably, only two arguments are viable.  First,
the balance sheet approach, and secondly, the break in causation as advo-
cated by –Dor–dević.  Which one is the better one?  It depends whether the
court believes that the fundamental underlying principle of Article 74 is
full compensation, namely, the balance sheet approach, or whether, pro-
cedurally, the causation of the breach is broken.  In the end, unfortu-
nately, there are still two competing arguments, and if harmonisation is
the deciding factor, the preamble would lean towards full compensation.
Hence, attorney’s fees are governed by the CISG.
However, it is recognised that the above academic view might be at
odds with the application of Article 74 by courts and tribunals, and will not
find favour.  Unfortunately, the preponderance of case law shows that the
34. Id. at 219.
35. It is an Australian native species of geese, but commonly called a wood
duck.
36. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods pmbl., Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/text/preamble.html.
37. Id.
38. Gotanda, supra note 16, at 140.
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courts deal with attorneys’ fees pursuant to the relevant domestic procedu-
ral rules and not under the CISG.  The same can be said in arbitration
proceedings, as arbitrators refer to the relevant applicable arbitration
rules to determine the issue of attorneys’ fees.  The possibility to achieve
unification on this issue arguably can come from other sources such as the
American Law Institute and the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law’s Principles on transnational civil procedure.  However, the
problem with development of soft law instruments is that they seldom
achieve harmonisation.  To that end, time will tell whether the courts and
arbitral tribunals will include attorneys’ fees into the regime of Article 74,
as indicated in this Article.
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